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COMMENTS
TELEVISION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Television, the newest media of mass communication, is now an
integral part of our way of life. A few short years ago it was just
a novel experiment. Today, the television receiving set is the focal
point of attention in millions of American living rooms.' Whenever
man perfects a new means of communication, there arise new and
complicated legal problems. One of the most interesting of these is
the effect of television on the individual's right of privacy.
The right of privacy was initially outlined in an article in the
Harvard Law Review by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
which appeared in 1890.2 They defined the interest protected by this
right as, "The right to be let alone," or "the right of inviolate person-
ality."3 The phraseology was credited to Judge Thomas Cooley in his
work on torts.4 The Restatement of Torts describes it as an interest
which one possesses in order to maintain his privacy and to live an
individual life.5 It is similar to both the more strongly protected
interest to have one's person free from unwanted intentional physical
contacts by others and to the interest in reputation. Both reputation
and privacy have a relation to the opinion of third persons. This
protected interest of privacy is found only in a comparatively highly
developed state of society. Two reasons for its only recent recognition
are that it normally involves nothing more than mental distress and
there is no clear line of demarcation as to what should be protected and
what should not.
There were decisions which protected an interest in privacy prior
to the Warren and Brandeis articleY They did not speak of a right of
privacy per se but based their protection on a property or contract
approach. The English court in 1848 enjoined the unauthorized publi-
cation of etchings made by the Queen and the Prince Consort on the
theory of implied contract and stated that:
"The common law.., shelters the privacy and seclusion of
I Estimated sets in use, 18,697,133, according to Weekly Television Summary in
Broadcasting Telecasting, p. 77, Oct. 6, 1952; Total television income for 1951
first reported at $43,600,000 which compares with a loss of $9,200,000 in 1950
according to 1951 Television Financial Data issued Mar. 6, 1952 by Federal
Communications Commission (Public Notice 73830); See Silverberg, Televis-
ing Old Films-Some New Legal Questions About Performers' and Proprie-
tors Rights, 38 VA. L. Rxv. 615 (1952).
2 Brandeis and Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
3 Supra, note 2 at 195.4 COO= ON ToRTs, 29 (2nd ed., 1888).
5 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs, §867 (1939) ; see Notes 15 A.L.R. 2d (1951), 168 A.L.R.
456 (1947), 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
6 Harrison v. Rutland, 1 Q.B. 142, 12 Eng. Rul. Case. 582-CA (1893) ; Pollard v.
Photographic Co. L.R. 40 Ch. Div. (1888).
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thought and sentiment committed to writing .... The invasion
(unauthorized publication) is of such kind and affects such
property as to entitle the plaintiff to the preventive remedy ...
because it is an intrusion-an unbecoming and unseemly intru-
sion . . . offensive to that inbred sense of propriety natural to
everyman."7
However, the courts still did not consider privacy an independent
right.
From protection only against physical interference with life and
property the law progressed to recovery for assault.8 Protection was
subsequently extended to slander, nuisance and alienation of affections. 9
The Declaration of Independence recognized the personal rights of an
individual by describing them as "the right to life."'" Incorporeal
rights as well as products and processes of the mind such as copy-
rights," trade marks," trade secrets, 3 and good will'- became protected.
Brandeis and Warren in their famous article vividly described this
development:
"The intense, intellectual and emotional life and the heightening
of sensations which came with the advance of civilization made
it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure and profit
of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognitions and the beautiful capacity for
growth which characterized the common law enabled the judges
to afford the requisite protection without the interpolation of the
legislature."' 5
The right of privacy is now recognized at common law in twenty
states.' 6 The legal right to be left alone exists in three states by
7 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. and G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1848), aff'd 2
De G. and Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
s Nizer, Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REv. 526, 527 (1941).
9 Warner, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW, §221 (1949).10 The Declaration of Independence (1776) ; Supra, note 2 at 193.
11 Supra, note 9, §211b.
12 Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215 (1803).
'13 Supra, note 2 at 195.
'4 Giblett v. Real, 9 Mod. 459 (1743).
15 Supra, note 2.
16 Alabama-Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948) ; Alaska-Smith v.
Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926) ; Arizona-Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63
Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945) ; California-Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53
Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942) ; District of Columbia-Peay v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. D.C. 1948); Florida-Cason v. Baskin,
159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947) ; Georgia-Pavesich v. New England Life In-
surance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101 (1905) ; Indiana-Pritchett
v. Board of Commissioners, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908); Kansas-Kunz
v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D, 1151 (1918); Kentucky-
Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 34 L.R.A., N.S. 1137(1909) ; Maryland-Graham v. Baltimore Post Co., Super. Ct. Baltimore, Md.
reported in 22 Ky. L. J. 108 (1932) ; Michigan- Pallas v. Crowley, Milner &
Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W. 2d 911 (1948) ; Missouri-Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Nevada-Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
64 Nev. 38, 177 P. 2d 442 (1947) ; New Jersey-Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J.
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statute.17 Wisconsin recognizes neither a statutory nor common law
right of privacy.' 8 There have been attempts to enact such legislation,
but thus far they have been unsuccessful.' 9 Analagous cases may have
differing results depending on whether the claim was based on a
statutory or a common law right. 20 We should bear this in mind while
analyzing some of these cases from other media of communication.
Limitations have been placed on the right of privacy. Generally,
it is considered to be a personal right and a widow, for instance, may
not bring an action based on an invasion of her deceased husband's
privacy.2 ' Corporations are held not to have such a right.22 Public
figures, such as holders of public office, have sacrificed their privacy
and part of their lives to public scrutiny as the price of the prominence
they attain.23 This is not a complete sacrifice, however. As the court
said in Sidis v F. R. Publishing Corp., "Public figures were not to be
stripped bare."
24
Closely related to the problem of public figures and individual
privacy is another major limitation on the right of privacy. That
limitation is the publication of matter which is of public or general
interest.25 The individual's interest in being left alone must give way
to the public's right to secure full information on all matters of legiti-
mate public interest. What constitutes a matter of legitimate public
interest is not easily defined. It is not only limited to personalities who
are in the public eye but extends also to news. News has been described
as "that indefinable quality of interest which attracts attention" or more
simply "the report of a recent occurrence. '2 Publication of informa-
Eq. 910, 67 A. 97, 14 L.R.A., N.S., 304 (1907); North Carolina-Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Ohio- Friedman v.
Cincinnati Local Joint & Executive Board, Ohio Com. PI., 6 Ohio Supp. 276(1941) ; Oregon-Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P. 2d 438, 138
A.L.R. 1 (1941); Pennsylvania- Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa. Dist. & Co. 101
(1939); South Carolina-Holloman v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 192 S.C. 454,
7 S.E. 2d 169, 127 A.L.R. 110 (1940).
17 NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, secs. 50, 51, McKiNNEY CONSOL. LAWS, c. 6;
UTAH REV. STATS., secs. 103-4-7, 103-4-8, 104-4-9 (1933) ; VA. CODE, sec. 8-650(1950).
1s Preist v. Stein, 220 Wis. 354, 265 N.W. 85 (1936).
19 For discussion of Wisconsin's position in regard to the right of privacy see
Comment 1952 Wis. L. REV. 507.
20 Supra, note 8.
21 Lunceford v. Wilcox, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 725, but see Smith v. Doss 251 Ala. 250, 37
So. 2d 118 (1948).22 Shubert v. Columbia Picture Corp. 72 N.Y.S. 2d 851 (1947), Aff'd. 80 N.Y.S.
2d 724 (1947); c. Maysville Transit v. Ort 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W. 2d 369
(1943).
23 Supra, note 2 at 214; Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926).
24 Sidis v. F.R. Publishing Corp. 113 F. 2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940), cert. den. 311
U.S. 711, 85 L. Ed. 462, 61 S. Ct. 393 (1940).
25 Ibid; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491
(1939) ; Barber v. Time Inc. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942) ; Cason v.
Baskin, et al, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944) ; Smith et al v. Doss 251 Ala.
250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948).2 8Sweenek v. Pathe News 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1936).
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tional and educational items as well as news is held not to be an
invasion of privacy.27
In addition to these limitations placed on the right of privacy,
the right may be waived either by express consent or by conduct
implying consent.2 An example of the latter is the holding in an
unreported case that to snap a candid camera picture of a bubble
dancer was not actionable because her course of conduct was tanta-
mount to a waiver.29 Both the common law and the statutory right of
privacy may be waived. 30 Nizer in his "Right of Privacy" points out
that statutory provisions that the consent must be in writing have
created unnecessary difficulties.31
Under certain conditions implied consent may be said to be with-
drawn. Under the common law recovery was allowed after retirement
from the public scene for sixteen months and in another case, seven
years.3 In New York, where the statutory right exists, a former child
prodigy was denied recovery even though he had withdrawn from
public life more than twenty-five years before the publication.3 3 The
court said that there may be "A limited scrutiny" of the past life of any
person who has achieved or has had thrust upon him the status of a
public figure. If the person has voluntarily sought limelight it would
appear very difficult for him to regain the statutory right by retirement.
The test is whether or not sufficient time has elapsed to deprive the
topic of its newsworthy value.
Numerous cases have arisen involving the use of an individual's
name or picture for trade and advertising purposes. Many courts will
recognize the right of privacy and will permit recovery where the
name and photograph are used without permission for commercial
exploitation.3 4 A person may, of course, consent to the use of his name
or photograph for advertising purposes.3 5 Under the New York right
of privacy statute the decided cases seem to indicate that there are two
tests to apply to determine whether an action lies for invasion of
privacy :36
(1) For newspapers, magazines and other periodicals, the court
will require that the offensive material be incorporated within the
physical confines of the advertisement before liability will be imposed.
27 Supra, note 24.2 8 Supra, note 9, §223b.
29 Supra, note 8 at 556; Time Magazine, Nov. 14, 1938 at p. 34.
30 Supra, note 28.
31 Supra, note 8 at 558-559.32 Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939) ; Melvin v. Reid
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
33 Supra, note 24; Comment, 38 VA. L. Rzv. 117 (1952).
- Kirby v. Hal Roach Studios 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942).
35 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. 124 F. 2d 167 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. den. 315 U.S.
823, 86 L. Ed. 1220, 62 S. Ct. 917 (1942).
36 Comment, 16 ALBANY L. REv. 72 (1952).
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(2) Regarding motion pictures, newsreels and television, the test
to be applied is whether the event depicted is one in which the public
has a legitimate public interest. The same rules would probably apply
to television whether the program was sponsored or sustaining since
radio sustaining programs have been held to be commercial in nature.8 7
The use of the photographs must be more than incidental. There is no
liability where the plaintiff's personality could make no real impression
on the public.38
Since television's potential audience is very great it will no doubt
rank as one of the largest of the mass communication and entertain-
ment industries. An individual's right of privacy is more directly
invaded by the reproduction on the television program of a physical
likeness and voice than by a newspaper or radio account.'0 All media
of communication have common means of violating one's privacy.
However, certain problems are distinct to television. The television
camera can not be as discriminating as a movie camera. Live television
broadcasts are viewed immediately and therefore there is no oppor-
tunity to edit and cut as is done with movies and newsreels.
Let us suppose the telecast of a recognized newsworthy event, a
baseball game. The cameraman focuses the television camera for more
than a passing or incidental view of a "rowdy" being ejected from the
stands of the stadium after he had caused a disturbance. Has this
"rowdy" waived all his privacy by purchasing a ticket to the game or
by his subsequent conduct? Another problem could arise where the
spectator caught by the camera is not involved in any disturbance, but
for personal reasons the spectator suffers some distress by his likeness
being seen on the television screen. For example, an employee reports
that he is ill and unable to come in for work. However, while viewing
the telecast of the afternoon baseball game the employer sees his in-
disposed employee in the crowd at the game. As a result the employee
is discharged. Has the employee any cause of action based on an
invasion of his privacy? The question that these examples appear to
raise is, "Just how discriminating must the television camera be ?" -
Because of the newness of TV we must now analyze the litigated
cases involving the right of privacy that have arisen in other media of
communication in an attempt to reach our conclusions. In Mau v Rio
Grande Oil Co., et al, the plaintiff had been held up by a robber and
had been shot and had suffered serious injury. The defendant radio
network and the commercial sponsor broadcast a dramatization of the
event and used plaintiff's name without his consent. When the plaintiff
37 Supra, note 9, §226.
38 Cook v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 95 N.Y.LJ. 2207 (Dec. 15, 1936).
39 Supra, note 9.
40 Ibid.
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heard the broadcast, he became mentally upset. He was further upset
by phone calls from friends who had also heard the broadcast and
wanted to discuss an experience which the plaintiff wished to forget.
Plaintiff remained upset the following day and was unable to safely
drive an automobile and as a result was discharged by his employer.
The court applying California law granted plaintiff recovery on the
ground that his constitutionally protected right to be let alone had been
violated.4 1 The California right of privacy is based on court interpreta-
tion of the California Constitution.42 However, the Alabama court
refused a claim under the following situation. Defendant radio station
broadcast an incident which occurred in 1905. The plaintiffs were two
sisters whose father disappeared in that year. A neighbor of his was
accused of murdering the father but was acquitted because of insuffi-
cient evidence. Plaintiffs' father was not dead but actually in California.
He died in 1930 and by his will named one of the plaintiffs as his
principal beneficiary. The court held that this incident was a matter of
legitimate public interest and therefore the broadcast was not an
actionable invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy.4
s
These two cases appear to have differing results. The California
decision indicates that since the right of privacy in that jurisdiction is
based on the state constitution, such a right takes preference over
whatever legitimate public interest might be involved in the broadcast
under consideration. Also, the right of privacy seems to be much more
firmly established in California than it is in Alabama.
A leading motion picture case is Melvin v. Reid. The plaintiff had
been a prostitute and was tried for murder and acquitted. Later she
reformed, was married and was living a respectable life. She had
made many friends who knew nothing of her former life. Seven
years after the acquittal for murder, the defendants without her con-
sent used her true maiden name and featured the unsavory incidents
of her past life in a motion picture. The California court imposed
liability on the following ground that:
"Publication of the unsavory incidents ... was a direct invasion
of her inalienable right guaranteed by our Constitution to pursue
and obtain happiness .... Whether we call this right of privacy
or call it any other is immaterial because it is a right guaranteed
by our constitution that must not be ruthlessly and needlessly
invaded by others.14
4
41 Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co. et al, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939).
42 Art. 2, sec. 1, "All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain
inalienable rights, among which are those enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and persuing and ob-
taining safety."
4 Smith et al v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948).
"Melvin v. Reid 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
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A motion picture of his store exhibited by a storekeeper for adver-
tising purposes depicted plaintiff in the store. Plaintiff did not consent
to the exhibition and the court found an invasion of privacy on the
ground of use for a trade or advertising purpose.4 5
A fictionalized portrayal of a person on the screen based on a news-
worthy event constitutes a violation of the right of privacy.48 Since the
New York Civil Rights statute4 7 recovery has been denied because the
plaintiff was not represented in appearance, personality, character, man-
ners or action. 48 Also if the portrayal is only incidental, the New York
statute does not provide a recovery.4 9
In Sweenek v. Pathe News, a newsreel of a group of corpulent
women attempting to reduce with the aid of some rather novel and
unique apparatus in a gym was held not actionable:
"Pictures of a group of corpulent women attempting to reduce
• ..do not cross the borderline at least so long as so large a
portion of the female sex continues its present concern about
excess in poundage. The amusing comments which accompanied
the pictures did not detract from their news value." 50
In trying to draw analogies between radio, movie and newsreel
cases and television cases it must be pointed out that the majority of
cases are from New York and California. New York, basing the right
of privacy on a statute, has construed that statute rather strictly in
most cases to favor the free flow of information. California, on the
other hand, adhering to common law privacy, has been fairly liberal
in recognizing and protecting the right of privacy even where it con-
flicts with a matter of legitimate public interest.51
Only a few cases have arisen thus far involving television and the
right of privacy. The leading one appears to be Gautier v. Pro Football
Inc.52 The action was commenced under the New York Civil Rights
Act, Section 51. The plaintiff was a producer of trained animal acts
45 Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
46 Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 201 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
47 Sec. 51, NEw YORK CIVIL RIGHTs AcT requires a clear representation of a per-
son, "at least approaching likeness."48 Leavy v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. 57 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
49 Freed v. Loew's Inc. 175 Misc. 616, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 679 (1940); In Merle v.
Sociological Research Film Corp. 116 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915), the
defendant produced a motion picture entitled, "The Inside of the White Slave
Traffic." One of the scenes showed a factory building upon which appeared
the plaintiff's name and business. The court denied recovery: "Certainly
where a man places his sign upon the outside of the building, he cannot claim
that a person, who would otherwise have a right to photograph the building,
is precluded from using the picture because the sign also appears on the
picture."
50 Supra, note 26.
51 Supra, note 9, §225c.
52 Gautier v. Pro Football Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S. 2d 553 (1951);
supra, note 36; Note 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 143 (1951) ; Note 3 SYRAcUSE L.
REV. 208 (1951).
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and he and his acts performed between the halves of a professional
football game, pursuant to a contract with the owner of the home team.
The plaintiff formally objected to the inclusion of his act in the telecast,
but the broadcasting company did telecast it. Plaintiff's name was in
the description accompanying the telecast. The trial court found an
invasion of plaintiff's privacy but the intermediate court reversed and
maintained that the use of plaintiff's name and picture was not a use
for trade or advertising purposes within the meaning of the statute.
The statute is not intended to protect the value of one's business, but
only to guard against injury to one's personality through unlawful
invasion of the limited right of privacy according to this opinion. The
court pointed out that:
"The extent of the impingement on plaintiff's privacy would in
this case seem to be minimal. There was no substantial invasion
of plaintiff's right to be let alone in telecasting an act voluntarily
performed by plaintiff for pay before 35,000 spectators. '53
The opinion indicated that it was loolng to precedents established
in earlier privacy cases. This would appear to indicate that in New
York at least, the previously announced precedents will be applied to
television problems. However, at some points the language of the
court might be interpreted as indicating a willingness to afford prefer-
ential treatment to television.54 Such treatment could be justified on the
ground that television is a new industry and needs encouragement.
Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., decided under California's com-
mon law right of privacy, arrived at the same result as the previous
case. The plaintiffs, well-known aquatic stars performed at a charity
benefit. Their contract with the promoter made no mention of tele-
vision. Motion pictures of the performance were televised by the
defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that this televising constituted an invasion
of their privacy. The court, sustaining a demurrer without leave to
amend, stated that:
"A performer or participant in a public, semi-public or private
show or event where other persons attend, thereby waives his
right of privacy so far as that performance or event is con-
cerned." 55
Since the plaintiffs had contracted to perform before a "live"
audience, they could not claim any "right to be let alone" as against
a television broadcast of their performance.
In Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co. a complaint by Jack
Sharkey, former heavyweight boxing champion, was held to state a
good cause of action under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights
53 Ibid, 106 N.Y.S. 2d at p. 557 (1951).
54Ibid.
55 Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044 (Cal. July 7, 1949).
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Act. Sharkey alleged that movies were taken of his boxing when he
was champion nearly twenty years previous. These movies were tele-
vised recently by the defendant without Sharkey's permission. The
court held that there was nothing in the complaint to show that the
telecast was merely dissemination of news nor did it show on its face
that plaintiff had so far restricted his right of privacy as to be without
standing to challenge the unauthorized use of his name and picture
for trade and advertising purposes.5 6 Since the boxing match occurred
about fifteen years prior-to the broadcast, the court rejected the broad-
casting company's contention that it was news. The Sharkey case,
although having a different result, is not necessarily contrary to the
Gautier and Peterson cases since the latter two cases involve the tele-
vising of a performer in a current action. The Sharkey case contains
no discussion of the question of whether consent to the taking of
motion pictures prior to the telecast operates as a consent to the tele-
vising of the motion pictures.
In another California case 57 the court denied an injunction to a
professional boxer, where he alleged that his-privacy would be invaded
because the promoter was going to televise a match in which the boxer
was to perform. The boxer was held to have waived his privacy even
before he appeared by agreeing to participate in the match.
Some of the privacy problems that could arise appear easy of
solution. Televising of participants in a public function is held to be
permissible under a waiver of privacy theory. One who consents to
appear in a televised audience participation show would appear to have
clearly waived by implication any objection to being televised. 8 The
televising of the entire audience at a public event does not give those
in the audience any action because such an event is one in which there
is a legitimate public interest. Also, from a practical viewpoint, it would
be impossible to secure waivers from all those in attendance. If such
waivers were required, these events could not be televised.5 9
Television authorities can also protect themselves by: (1) Educating
their cameramen to focus only on the primary subject matter to be
telecast; (2) Making a discriminating choice of the subject matter to be
telecast; (3) Securing written waivers wherever necessary, and (4)
drafting contracts carefully so that all may know their rights as to
privacy.60
Since right of privacy problems are now appearing as a result of
56 Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc., 93 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1950);
Note 23 A.L.R. 2d 294 (1952).
57 Chavez v. Hollywood Post No. 43, American Legion, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 2362
(Cal. Feb. 3, 1948).
58s Baylan, Legal and Illegal Limitations on Televiion Programming, 11 FED.
Comm. B. J. 137 (1951).59 Supra, note 9, §226.60 Ibid.
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television, the question may be asked, "What remedy, common law or
statutory, appears best designed for all concerned?" Numerous legal
commentators urge that the common law theory be extended to cover
the right of privacy in all fields where this right might be infringed.61
They suggest that under the common law the approach may be more
flexible and thus may be more readily adapted to individual fact situ-
ations. Where the statutory right exists, it has been strictly construed.
The statutory right has for an advantage, however, a more standard-
ized norm by which the public and the television industry both may be
guided.
Due to the lack of litigation involving television, it is still question-
able as to how far the precedents from analagous cases in other media
will be applied to television by the courts although some courts have
already done this.62 In applying these analogous cases it will be neces-
sary to keep in mind the difference between television and other media
as to scope, production methods and types of events depicted.6 3 One
commentator points out:
"As applied to television the nature of the cause of action
(invasion of privacy) will be no different from what it has been
in the past, but television broadcasters are in greater danger from
such suits than the motion picture, radio, magazine or newspaper
business because of the speed with which television films are
used after production and the indiscriminating eye of the camera
when broadcasts are live."1
64
The right of privacy is based on public policy. This policy recog-
nizes that, despite our complex society of today, each person still
retains some of his individuality and privacy. Public policy also
fosters and protects the free flow of news and information. It does so
in order to encourage and aid the education and entertainment of our
citizenry. Each case involving the right of privacy would seem to
resolve itself into a clash between the private rights of the individual
and the public rights to a free flow of news and information.
As we have seen, invasions of the right of privacy have created
problems in other media of communication, similar to those now
arising in television. Either through common law decisions or through
legislative enactments, the solutions found to these problems in the
majority of cases have been satisfactory to both the individual and the
public. There is every reason to believe that similar solutions may be
found also for current television problems.
J. JOSEPH CUMMINGS
61 Supra, note 9; Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 BOSTON U. L. REv. 353
(1932) ; Note 43 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1929) ; Note 26 ILL. L. REv. 63 (1932).6 2 Supra, notes 52, 55 and 56.
- Supra, note 37.64 Supra, note 58.
[Vol. 36
